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I. INTRODUCTION

There is much debate among legal and business scholars and
practitioners concerning whether maximizing shareholder wealth is a
principle that has truly been codified in the United States, as well as the
resulting impact that the codification of this principle could have on corporations. Recent decisions, such as eBay v. Newmark, 1 and even a case
decided nearly one hundred years ago, Dodge v. Ford, 2 have created confusion resulting in various analyses and opinions regarding these issues. 3
Although the legal debate continues regarding whether corporations and
directors of those corporations must make all decisions with the aim of
maximizing shareholder wealth, shareholder primacy and the maximization of shareholder wealth remain foundational corporate doctrines
taught in business and law schools around the country. 4 This corporate
doctrine is, and will continue to be, the underlying basis that informs
most decisions made for corporations by legal advisors, directors, and
other decision makers. 5
Part II of this comment provides a view of the education provided in business and law schools concerning the goal of corporations, i.e.
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how that goal—the maximization of shareholder wealth—has become a
foundational corporate doctrine for many attorneys and businesspeople,
and the impact the combination of that goal and benefit corporations has
on deciding whether a corporation should take socially responsible action.
Part III of this comment examines the extent to which maximizing shareholder wealth is taught as a principle of corporations in business
and law schools and discusses a recent survey of the specific corporate
principles that are taught. It concludes by discussing the impact that
those teachings have had on students that have gone on to become attorneys, businesspeople, and key decision makers.
Part IV of this comment discusses the influence that the proliferation of state statutes allowing for the formation of benefit corporations
has on traditional corporations and its legal counsel, directors, and other
key decision makers. It then discusses the possibility that decision makers of traditional corporations will become more averse to taking part in
socially responsible actions as a result of the rise of benefit corporations.
II. MAXIMIZING SHAREHOLDER WEALTH IS TAUGHT AS A NORM IN
BUSINESS AND LAW SCHOOL

Over the last several decades, as free-market economists from
the University of Chicago and their ideas became more prominent, there
has been a fundamental change in the way business and law schools
viewed and taught students about the purpose of corporations. 6 According to these economists, “economic analysis revealed the proper purpose
of the public corporation clearly, and that purpose was to make money
for its dispersed shareholder[s].” 7 Further, professors teaching this “newschool” of thought declared that any action taken by agents of a corporation that pursued a goal outside of maximizing shareholder wealth was
improper as the action was outside of the proper purpose of corporaSee Lynn A. Stout, The Problem of Corporate Purpose, 48 ISSUES IN GOVERNANCE STUD.
1, 2 (June 2012).
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tions. 8 Schools shifted accordingly to emphasize stockholder primacy
and the maximization of shareholder wealth as fundamental principles of
business and corporate law. 9 Further, business schools and law schools
deemphasized the theory that a corporation’s purpose is to provide employees with well-paying jobs, satisfy customer demands, be a good corporate citizen, and provide a return to investors. 10
This shift in focus has now impacted generations of students,
businesspeople, and attorneys as undergraduate business students,
MBAs, and law students typically learn through their respective schooling that the mantra of maximizing shareholder wealth is a standard business practice that must inform business decisions. 11 Mr. Steve Denning, a
lawyer who worked at the World Bank for several decades, stated that
the idea of maximizing shareholder wealth “is now deeply embedded in
the basic economics that is taught in business schools and economics
faculties around the world.” 12 Mr. Denning studied and analyzed the
fundamental principles of managerial economics—a theory of economics
that is taught in many undergraduate, graduate, and professional schools
and the resulting implications that this theory has had on business practices. 13 As part of this study, Mr. Denning examined several of the bestselling course textbooks on economics and discovered that all the course
textbooks are “built on” the doctrines that corporations must maximize
shareholder wealth and that “the whole job of the manager is to maximize profit for the company and its shareholders.” 14 Specifically, “the very
8
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foundation of managerial economics is . . . maximizing shareholder value.” 15 In-fact, the best-selling books assume that the corporate manager’s
end-goal is to maximize the profits of the corporation’s shareholders. 16
In 2011, Mr. Darrel M. West, the vice president and director of
Governance Studies and a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution in
Washington D.C., examined business and law school curriculum to determine which perspectives and guiding principles are taught in America’s higher education system. 17 Further, Mr. West set out to determine
student perceptions about the role business is supposed to play in society. 18
Upon interviewing professors and faculty members at top business and law schools, analyzing the curriculum taught at these schools,
reviewing course syllabi, and reviewing survey data of students’ views
and perceptions, Mr. West came to several conclusions. 19 First, in American business and law schools, great emphasis is put on the theory that
the purpose of a corporation is to maximize shareholder wealth—this
emphasis was especially acute in law schools that cover the purpose of a
corporation. 20 Second, Mr. West found that after completing business
school, students are far more likely to view maximizing shareholder
wealth as the paramount focus of a corporation compared to when they
started their education. 21 Third, few business or law schools require
courses that provide broader perspectives on the role or purpose of cor-
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porations, and this lack of required education has impacted not only the
business community but society at large. 22
Specifically, Mr. West found that, in regard to law schools, “[t]he
dominant ‘law and economics’ conception taught in many schools emphasizes profit maximization and enhancing shareholder value.” 23 For
example, Mr. Michael Kausner, a professor at Stanford Law School, instructs his students that the purpose of a corporation is to maximize
shareholder wealth and teaches corporate social responsibility only in the
context of accruing goodwill for the corporation, which can result in an
overall increase in shareholder wealth. 24
Further, Mr. West discovered in his research that many business
schools added corporate governance classes to its curriculum as a result
of the many corporate scandals that occurred in the early 2000’s. 25 However, Mr. West found that these courses often did not actually address
the purpose of corporations and the role that corporations should hold
in society, but instead tended to focus on the arduous decisions individuals and organizations may face. 26 Mr. West appears to largely attribute
this focus to business professors who are already indoctrinated into the
shareholder wealth maximization theory. 27 For example, some professors
at top business schools vehemently argue that teaching and discussing
the idea that corporations should sometimes act in the interest of the
public is “fundamentally flawed.” 28 In fact, Mr. Aneel Karnani, a professor at Michigan’s Ross School of Business, stated that the concept of
corporations acting in the interest of the public could have detrimental
22
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effects on corporations since “in most cases, doing what’s best for society means sacrificing profits.” 29
Last, Mr. West analyzed an Aspen Institute study conducted of
students at fifteen business programs over three years. 30 Among other
questions, this study asked students what was the paramount function of
a corporation. 31 The study revealed that the vast majority of these “students believe the primary purpose of a corporation is to maximize shareholder value[.]” 32 Further, these “students believe [maximizing shareholder wealth] is how current corporate leaders behave when they are
making decisions.” 33
Ms. Lynn Stout, Distinguished Professor of Corporate and Business Law at Cornell School of Law, summarized the impact that business
and law schools have had on societal views on the goal of corporations. 34
Professor Stout stated that “[m]ost people today would say corporations
have but one proper purpose: maximizing their shareholders’ wealth”
and that doing things that positively impact other stakeholders like
“providing good jobs—are viewed as legitimate business ends only to the
extent they increase ‘shareholder value.’” 35 Professor Stout concluded
that “[t]his view prevails in large part because it’s what is taught in our
nation’s classrooms.” 36
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The focus of business and law schools in regard to the purpose
of corporations has drastically changed over the last several decades. 37
Business and law schools now instruct students that maximizing shareholder wealth is a fundamental principle of corporations and that key
decision makers and legal advisors should follow this tenet. 38 This instruction has had a tremendous impact on the corporate environment as
maximizing shareholder wealth has become a standard principle that informs people making business and legal decisions while advising corporations and their key decision makers. 39
III. BENEFIT CORPORATIONS MAKE KEY DECISION MAKERS AT
TRADITIONAL CORPORATIONS MORE AVERSE TO
APPROVING CSR ACTIVITY

Part II illustrates what business and law students have been
taught over the last several decades—maximizing shareholder wealth is
the paramount goal of traditional corporations, and that this mantra has
become a foundational corporate doctrine. This section argues that because business people already view corporate decisions from a lens of
maximizing shareholder wealth, creating new structures like benefit corporations that authorize socially responsible actions and a viewpoint towards other stakeholders will make legal counsel, directors, and other key
decision makers in traditional corporations even more averse to considering all stakeholders and taking socially responsible actions. This distinction reinforces the principle that traditional corporations should maximize shareholder wealth.
With the advent and proliferation of benefit corporations, the
specific statutory language that grants the ability for organizations to
form as benefit corporations and the repeated mantra by journalists,
scholars, and businesspeople of benefit corporations as corporations that
“do good,” it appears that if a corporation wants to engage in socially
37
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responsible actions, the corporation must first reorganize as a benefit
corporation. 40
Many states have passed statutes that allow for the formation of
benefit corporations. 41 Some state statutes allowing for the formation of
benefit corporations require the name of all benefit corporations to include the term “benefit corporation” or a similar variation. 42 This name
requirement provides immediate differentiation between benefit corporations and traditional corporations, which allows consumers and the public to easily distinguish corporations that are considering goals outside of
maximizing shareholder wealth. This differentiation likely impacts the
mindset of key corporate decision makers and advisors by reaffirming
the proper goal of traditional corporations—maximizing shareholder
wealth, and benefit corporations—considering action that benefits society.
As benefit corporations have gained popularity, and states have
enacted statutes allowing for them, there has been an inundation of published works that discuss benefit corporations, including the purpose of
this new entity type. Newspapers, magazines, and online articles, as well
as scholarly works with titles like “With a Public Benefit Corporation,
Profit and Good Karma Can Coexist[,]” “A Benefit Corporation Can
Have a Positive Impact on the World -- and Still Make a Profit[,]” “Public benefit corporations: A new option for Minnesota companies that do
good[,]” “The Benefit Corporation: A Tool For Building A Sustainable
Brand[,]” and “Creating a class of ‘do good’ companies” make it clear
that many mainstream business publications view benefit corporations as
distinct from traditional corporations since benefit corporations can “do
See MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 1-502(a)(2); Gene Bulmash, A Benefit Corporation Can Have a Positive Impact on the World, ENTREPRENEUR MAGAZINE (Nov. 2, 2015),
https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/252259.
40
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good.” 43 These publications also likely influence the overall mindset of
key corporation decision makers and advisors by increasing the apparent
differentiation between these two entities. For example, when stating
why Warby Parker eschewed the traditional corporate form, one of
Warby Parker’s cofounders, Neil Blumenthal, stated “[w]e wanted to
build a business that could make profits. But we also wanted to build a
business that did good in the world.” 44
States’ statutory language requiring differentiation in the name of
the corporation along with business publications and scholarly articles
declaring that benefit corporations are for corporations that “do good”
have the combined effect of further reinforcing the principle that traditional corporations must always maximize shareholder wealth. Essentially, among for-profit companies, benefit corporations likely create a binary view for decision makers—traditional corporations exist to maximize
shareholder wealth and prohibit any action that does not do so, including
socially responsible actions; benefit corporations are the proper structure
for corporations that want to engage in socially responsible actions. 45
This reinforces the mantra that traditional corporations must attempt to
always maximize shareholder wealth because if a traditional corporation
Howes, With a Public Benefit Corporation, Profit and Good Karma Can Coexist, ENTREMAGAZINE (Dec. 11, 2015), https://www.entrepreneur.com/ article/253059#; Gene Bulmash, A Benefit Corporation Can Have a Positive Impact on the World
-- and Still Make a Profit, ENTREPRENEUR MAGAZINE (Nov. 2, 2015),
https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/252259; Sarah Duniway & Julia Offenhauser,
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2013/09/20/creating-a-class-of-do-good companies/?c507522e8003.
43Tim

PRENEUR

James Surowiecki, Companies with Benefits, THE NEW YORKER (Aug. 4, 2014),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/08/04/companies-benefits.

44

45

McGregor, supra note 44; See West, supra note 4, at 1, 2, 5, 10–12, 14 (2012).

412

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 19

wanted to engage in actions like considering the environment or providing a livable wage, the mindset is that these are actions that should be
taken by a benefit corporation, not a traditional corporation. 46
Key decision makers at traditional corporations already must
consider the potential legal implications of engaging in corporate social
responsibility activity because of the unclear legality of the doctrine of
maximizing shareholder wealth for corporations. 47 eBay and other similar
cases likely provide some concern for advisors and decision makers in
traditional corporations when those corporations decide to engage in
socially responsible activities that could be construed as not maximizing
shareholder wealth. 48 As states continue to adopt benefit corporation
statutes and grow in popularity, decision makers at traditional corporations will likely become increasingly concerned about advising a corporation to engage in any behavior that could be interpreted as not maximizing shareholder wealth. 49 This is because regardless of the actual legal
implications of traditional corporations and benefit corporations, from a
business and societal standpoint, it appears as though traditional corporations should not engage in any behavior that does not maximize shareholder wealth, as traditional corporations are not the proper entity for
such actions or considerations. 50
If traditional corporations severely limit socially responsible behavior, this could dramatically reduce the positive impact that corporations have and would likely curb any further growth in socially responsible behavior. For example, many traditional corporations currently use
the buy one, give one model made popular by TOM’s Shoes, Inc., in
which TOM’s gives away a pair of shoes to someone who could not oth46

See West, supra note 4, at 1, 2, 10–12.

Johnson, supra note 3, at 405, 439–40, 444–451 (2013); Chu, supra note 3, at 155, 163–
181 (2012).

47

48

Id.

49

See West, supra note 4, at 1, 2, 10–12.

50

See id.

2017]

THE END OF SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE BEHAVIOR TOO?

413

erwise afford them. 51 However, as benefit corporations become more
prevalent, and if legal questions still remain with respect to requiring a
traditional corporation to always maximize shareholder wealth, corporate
decision makers will likely become more concerned with non-profit maximizing behavior, which will result in less corporations “doing good.”
IV. CONCLUSION

The specific requirements of state statutes allowing for benefit
corporations and the view of the purpose of benefit corporations espoused by business and scholarly publications, combined with the education received in business and law schools reinforces the idea that traditional corporations exist only to maximize shareholder wealth. 52 This reinforcement, coupled with the questions from case law surrounding
whether traditional corporations must always maximize shareholder
wealth, will likely lead to a decrease in traditional corporations engaging
in socially responsible behavior. 53
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